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Abstract 
We discuss representing and reasoning with 
knowledge about the time-dependent util­
ity of an agent's actions. Time-dependent 
utility plays a crucial role in the interac­
tion between computation and action under 
bounded resources. We present a semantics 
for time-dependent utility and describe the 
use of time-dependent information in deci­
sion contexts. We illustrate our discussion 
with examples of time-pressured reasoning in 
Protos, a system constructed to explore the 
ideal control of inference by reasoners with 
limited abilities. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Decision-theoretic methods have been considered inap­
plicable for general problem solving because they re­
quire agents to possess a utility function that provides 
a preference ordering over outcomes of action, and to 
have access to a probability distribution over outcomes 
associated with each decision (Simon et al., 1987). We 
have investigated methods for maximizing utility in 
reasoning systems, given limitations in computational 
abilities and information. In particular, we have ex­
plored the problem of computing probability distribu­
tions under resource constraints. To a lesser extent, 
we have studied the assessment and custom-tailoring 
of utility models for time-dependent action. 
Performing inference to determine a probability distri­
bution can delay an agent's action. Inference-related 
delays can lead to losses stemming from competition 
for limited resources, decay of physiological states, and 
problems with coordination among independent deci­
sion makers. Endowing an agent with the ability to 
trade off the accuracy or precision of an analysis for 
more timely responses can increase the expected value 
of that agent's behavior. Growing interest and re­
cent work by several investigators have addressed such 
tradeoffs in reasoning systems (Doyle, 1988; Horvitz, 
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1988; Boddy and Dean, 1989; Russell and Wefald, 
1989; Breese and Horvitz, 1990). 
We constructed the Protos system to experiment with 
the use of metareasoning procedures to control infer­
ence approximation methods (Horvitz et al., 1989a). 
Protos determines the length of time it should dwell 
on an inference problem before taking action in the 
world. Protos iteratively computes a myopic estimate 
of the expected value of computation (EVC) by bal­
ancing the cost of delay with the benefits expected 
from additional refinement of the probabilities used in 
a decision problem. The system makes use of informa­
tion about the convergence of approximate results to 
exact answers, and about the time-dependent change 
of the utility of outcomes. 
We discuss several aspects of our work on the con­
sideration of time-dependent utility of outcomes. We 
review background on the Protos system, describe 
the semantics and assessment procedures for time­
dependent utility, and discuss the custom-tailoring of 
default time-dependent utility models given observa­
tions. Finally, we describe the operation of Protos by 
presenting examples of the system's behavior. 
2 A LIMITED REASONER 
Determining the expected value of alternate actions 
under uncertainty requires the assignment of belief, 
p(HJE,�), to one or more relevant hypotheses, H, 
given observations, E, and background information, 
�- Inference approximation algorithms produce partial 
results in the form of bounds or second-order probabil­
ity distributions on relevant probabilities. Let us refer 
to relevant probabilities as rj;. If we are forced to act 
immediately, we should take an action D that max­
imizes our expected utility, given the mean of p(rj;), 
< p(rj;) > (Howard, 1970). The utility of this action 
is equal to the utility of the decision we would make 
had belief in q, been a point probability at the mean 
of p(rj;). That is, 
arg maxu(D, p(rj;)) = arg maxu(D, <p(r/;)>) 
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Figure 1: Protos' four components include (1) a metar­
easoner that considers the benefits of continuing to 
compute, (2) an inference base containing probabilistic 
inference procedures, (3) belief networks representing 
domain domain; and ( 4) a problem-specific decision 
model. Inference and time-dependent utility depend 
on observations. 
Additional computation can tighten a second-order 
distribution. However, the utility of outcomes can di­
minish with time. Thus, there is a tradeoff between 
the benefits of making a decision based on a more pre­
cise result and the costs associated with delay. An 
EVC analysis compares the expected utility of instan­
taneous action with the expected utility of action that 
might be taken following future computation, includ­
ing the costs of that computation. 
An exact EVC analysis can consume a significant por­
tion of the total computational cost of solving an in­
ference problem. Our investigation on the control 
of belief-network inference has focused on the use of 
tractable EVC approximations. Approximate EVC 
analyses include single-step or myopic analyses. In my­
opic analyses, the EVC is computed under the assump­
tion that an agent will take an action in the world after 
reasoning for a predetermined increment of time; we 
undertake a myopic analysis to determine if additional 
analysis is more valuable than immediate action. One 
approach to computing the expected utility delaying 
action is to consider the set of second-order distribu­
tions expected with additional computation. For each 
feasible future distribution, we consider the value of 
the best action, given that distribution, and weight 
that utility by the probability of the future distribu­
tion. 
Protos makes use of myopic EVC analyses. Protos 
has four major components, pictured schematically in 
Figure 1: (1) a metareasoner; (2) an inference base 
containing inference procedures; (3) a domain-specific 
knowledge base in the form of belief networks; and 
( 4) a problem-specific decision model. At run time, 
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Figure 2: Lottery for assessing time-dependent utili­
ties. We query a decision maker for the probability p 
of instant, painless death that would make him indif­
ferent between his future life lottery when treated at 
timet, and having a 1- p chance at continuing his life 
as if the challenge facing him had not occurred. 
a decision problem containing alternate actions, out­
comes, and utilities is passed to Protos. Given a de­
cision problem, Protos initiates an iterative cycle of 
reasoning and metareasoning. Object-level inference 
is interleaved with metareasoning about the value of 
continuing to perform additional inference. 
At the start of each cycle, Protos computes the EVC 
associated with continuing object-level computation 
for an additional increment of time. If the metarea­
soner indicates that the EVC associated with the next 
increment of reasoning is zero or negative computation 
ceases and the system takes an action indicated by the 
mean of the second-order probability distribution. De­
pending on the computational hardware, the structure 
of the time-dependent utility model, and the expected 
refinement of the second-order probability distribution 
by an inference algorithm, Protos may (1) take an im­
mediate reflex action, (2) dictate a best action after 
some partial inference, or (3) take an action it proves 
to be dominant. Decision dominance can be proved 
before inference is completed with the use of a proba­
bility bounding algorithm. A decision dominates oth­
ers when a single action is indicated for the range of 
probabilities in the interval bordered by an upper and 
lower bound on the probability. 
We have experimented with a tractable myopic ap­
proximation named EVC/BC (for EVC-bounds cate­
goricaD to control probabilistic bounding. With this 
form of EVC, we compute the value of tightening 
categorical upper and lower bounds on a probabil­
ity. EVC/BC hinges on interpreting upper and lower 
bounds as a second-order probability distribution. The 
measure is based on a least-commitment interpretation 
of bounds as a uniform distribution between the upper 
and lower bounds, with a mean at the midpoint of the 
bounds interval. The small amount of time required 
for the EVC/BC analysis is included in the EVC anal­
ysis itself. Details about the nature, limitations, and 
use of EVC/BC are described in (Horvitz, 1990). 
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3 TIME-DEPENDENT UTILITY 
Let us consider the use of Protos to solve time­
pressured medical problems. We have worked to repre­
sent in Protos the cost of delaying treatment as a func­
tion of the time a patient has remained in an untreated 
acute pathophysiological state. Physicians delivering 
emergency medical care often rely on knowledge about 
the cost of delay in treating a patient. 
3.1 Semantics and Representation of 
Time-Dependency 
In answer to a query for assistance Protos propa­
gates observations about a patient's symptomatology 
through a belief network. The system deliberates 
about whether to make a treatment recommendation 
immediately, based on a partial analysis, or to defer its 
action and to continue inference, given its knowledge 
about the costs of delay. 
We represent time-dependent action by considering a 
continuum of decisions, each defined by initiating an 
action at a progressively later time, and by assessing 
the change in utility of the outcome as a function of 
this time. We use A ;H j, t to refer to an action, A;, 
taken at time t when state Hj is true. We define t in 
terms of an initial time, t0, the time a physiological 
challenge begins. We define the utility of u(A;H j, t) at 
different times t, with an acute-challenge lottery. To 
assess the cost of delaying a treatment, we ask a deci­
sion maker to consider a time-pressured problem that 
he might face in a decision context. Next, we imagine 
that there is a treatment that can rid him instantly of 
the acute affliction with probability 1 -p. Unfortu­
nately, with probability p, the treatment will kill him, 
immediately and painlessly. We assume that, if a pa­
tient wins this lottery, he will continue his life as if 
the acute incident had not occurred; that is, he faces 
his preincident future life lottery. To assess the utility, 
u(A ;Hj, t), at progressively later times t for action, we 
ask a decision maker for the probability p of instant, 
painless death that would make him indifferent to ac­
cepting the uncertain outcome of being treated for an 
acute illness at time t or having a 1- p chance of con­
tinuing his life as if the acute incident facing him had 
never occurred. We take the difference in the probabil­
ities of death for action at time t and at a later time t' 
as the loss in utility. We can measure the cost of delay 
in terms of micromorts. A micromort is a 10-6 chance 
of immediate, painless death. Alternatively we can 
assign dollar values to the risks incurred with delay. 
We can use the worth-numeraire model introduced by 
Howard (Howard, 1980) to convert small probabilities 
of death to dollars in terms of dollars per micromort. 
Beyond assessing utilities for each moment of action, 
we can model the utility of action at progressively later 
times with functions that encode a micromort flux for 
each outcome. The micromort flux is the number of 
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Figure 3: A graphical representation of the utility of 
two actions under uncertainty. The lines indicate the 
utilities of action A1 and action A2 as a function of 
the probability of hypothesis H1. The lines cross at a 
threshold probability of hypothesis H1 called p*. 
micromorts we incur with each second of delay. We 
experimented with parametric utility equations and 
found several to be useful for summarizing the time 
dependency of alternate outcomes. Two functions we 
used to model losses with time, are the linear and ex­
ponential forms, 
u(A;Hj, t) = u(A;Hj,to)e-k.t 
u(A;Hj, t) = u(A;Hj,to)-cbt where u(A;Hj,t) 2:0 
where ka and Cb are parameter constants derived 
through fitting a series of micromort assessments to a 
functional form or are assessed directly. Our language 
for assessing and representing mathematical models 
of time-dependence allows decision makers to encode 
lower bounds on utility over time, and to make state­
ments about the chaining of sequences of functional 
forms. 
3.2 Utility of Action in Time-Pressured 
Contexts 
Given time-dependent utilities, we can compute the 
expected value of different actions, A;, in terms of the 
likelihood of alternative outcomes, Hj. The expected 
utility (eu) of taking action A; at timet is 
n 
eu(A;, t) _L p(Hj JE,�)u(A;Hi, t) 
j=l 
Consider the simple case of a binary time-dependent 
decision problem. We have two states of the world 
(e.g., diseases) H1 and H2 and two best actions (treat­
ments) A1 and A2 to address each state. As an exam­
ple, the states can be the presence and absence of a 
disease, and the ideal actions can be treating and not 
treating for the disease. Under uncertainty, we must 
consider the utilities of four outcomes: u(A2H2, t), 
u(A1H2,t), u(A1H1,t), and u(A2H1,t). If H1 and H2 
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Figure 4: This graph displays how the utility of an 
outcome can decay as a function of time. In this case, 
the utility of taking action A1, in the context of H1, 
diminishes with delay. The utility associated with im­
mediate action (broken line) and delaying action (ad­
jacent solid line) is displayed. Note that the decision 
threshold, p•, is also a function of time; in this case, 
p* increases as the utility of A1H1, t decreases. 
are mutually exclusive states, the expected utilities of 
the actions eu(A1, t) and eu(A2, t) are: 
eu(A1, t) 
eu(A2, t) 
p(H1jE, �) ( u(A1 H1, t) - u(A1H2, t)) 
+u(A1H2, t) 
p(HtiE, 0 ( ( u(A2H1, t)- u(A2H2, t)) 
+u(A2H2,t) 
The expected utilities of actions A1 and A2, as a func­
tion of the probability of H1, are graphed in Figure 3. 
Note that the equations specify the expected utility of 
two action as lines intersecting at a threshold probabil­
ity of H1, denoted p•. As we increase the probability 
of p(Ht) from zero to 1, the decision with the great­
est expected utility shifts, at p•, from A1 to A2. If 
we must act immediately, we take an action dictated 
by the mean of the second-order distribution: We take 
action At if the mean of the second-order distribution 
over p(Ht iE, �) is greater than p•. Otherwise it is best 
to take action A2. 
A computational agent rarely is forced to act imme­
diately. An agent can pause to continue inference, or 
to reflect about the costs and benefits of delaying an 
action to compute a better decision. The dynamics 
of reasoning about belief and action under bounded 
resources is highlighted in Figure 4. The figure shows 
how the utility of outcome A1 H1, t might diminish 
with delay. The dashed line shows the expected utility 
of taking At in the context of H1 at an initial time, 
i0• The adjacent solid line indicates the diminished 
expected utility of taking the action at a later time 
t, given the truth of H1. Note that, as the utility of 
taking action A1 falls, the decision threshold, p•, in­
creases. 
In a time-pressured computational setting the utility 
of one or more outcomes decay with delay. At the 
same time, inferential processes may be underway to 
refine bounds or a second-order distribution over prob­
abilities of interest. Figure 4 shows the concurrent 
tightening of upper and lower bounds by a bounding 
algorithm. As the utility lines pivot or sweep down 
at rates dictated by the decay functions for each out­
come approximate inference continues to tighten the 
bounds, yielding a time-dependent dynamics of belief 
and action. 
3.3 Run-Time Modification of Criticality 
Most of the work on Protos has relied on the use of 
files of utilities assessed for prototypical situations. 
The utility information is represented in tuples which 
contain the utility of immediate action, and time de­
pendent decay, indexed by A;HJ pairs. However, we 
also have explored the construction of models of time­
dependent utility. With the modeling approach, we 
assess utilities that represent preferences for canoni­
cal situations and apply a mathematical model to cus­
tomize "average case" utilities and time-dependencies 
to a specific decision maker and situation. To handle 
time-pressured medical decisions, we elicit from an ex­
pert decision maker-in our case, an emergency-room 
physician1-functions that modify the micromort flux 
of relevant outcomes, in response to arguments of dis­
crete and real-valued patient vital signs. We experi­
mented with functions that provide time-dependency 
parameters as a function of the patient's age, heart 
rate, blood pressure, and partial pressure of oxygen in 
the blood (Pa02). In practice, Protos makes use of 
default time-dependent utility models if no vital signs 
are observed. Given the observation of vital signs, 
and the availability of information about the specific 
class of decision problem, the initial utility and time­
dependence are customized. 
Our work on customizing time-dependent utility 
through constructing models of criticality parallels 
work in the medical decision analysis community on 
tools for assisting physicians to induce the utility func­
tions of patients by identifying key features of their 
personalities (McNeil et a!., 1982; Jimison, 1990). Our 
experimentation with deterministic functions for mod­
ifying utility models is a modest initial approach to 
customizing default time-dependent models. In the 
general case, modeling the utility of decision makers, 
such as patients receiving time-critical therapy, is a 
problem of diagnosis under uncertainty. 
10ne of the authors (G.R.) has served as the source of 
emergency-medicine expertise. 
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Figure 5: Time-dependent inference and ideal action. 
(a) Protos displays the convergence of the upper and 
lower bounds (ub, lb) on a probability of interest 
and the time-dependent decision threshold (p'). The 
vertical line indicates the time for action. (b) The 
time-dependent utilities for four possible outcomes. 
4 PROTOS IN ACTION 
We now examine the behavior of Protos in solving 
several simplified time-dependent decision problems in 
medicine. In the examples we determine the ideal time 
to perform inference with the bounded-conditioning 
approximation strategy (Horvitz et a!., 1989b), given 
time-dependent changes in the utility of outcomes. 
Bounded conditioning is based on the method of con­
ditioning (Pearl, 1988). The method works by de­
composing a belief-network inference problem into a 
set of simpler, singly connected belief-networks and 
solving these subproblems in order of their contri­
bution to upper and lower bounds on a probability 
of interest. The more subproblems that are solved, 
the tighter the bounds. We shall examine decisions 
based on inference with Dxnet and Alarm, multiply 
connected belief networks that were assessed for rea­
soning about acute medical problems (Beinlich et al., 
1989; Rutledge et a!., 1989) 2 We note that several 
approximation algorithms and exact algorithms (such 
as the clique-tree method of Lauritzen and Spiegel­
halter (Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988)) can solve 
inference problems with these networks faster than 
bounded conditioning can perform a complete anal­
ysis. However, the incremental and well-characterized 
convergence of bounds by bounded conditioning gives 
us the opportunity to explore fundamental interactions 
between time-dependent belief and utility, and more 
generally, to develop principles for optimizing the value 
of actions taken by an agent with limited inferential 
abilities. Principles of utility-directed control promise 
to be most valuable for controlling probabilistic infer­
ence in larger belief networks, such as the evolving 
QMR-DT network for internal medicine (Shwe et al., 
1990). 
2 Alarm is a 37 node belief network; DxNet has 81 nodes. 
Figure 6: Graphical analysis of action. The util­
ity (crossing solid lines) of treating for hypothesis H1 
(Util(A1)) and for H2 (Util(A2)) as a function of the 
probability of H1. Broken lines indicates the utilities 
of acting at t0• The vertical line (p) displays the value 
of the exact probability, computed after the decision 
to take action A2 was made. 
4.1 Case Analyses 
Figure 5(a) displays the time-dependent decision 
threshold, p• and the convergence of the upper and 
lower bounds (ub,lb) on a probability computed by 
bounded-conditioning with the Alarm network. As­
sume we are employing inference to determine the 
probability of a life-threatening respiratory pathophys­
iology (H1), requiring dangerous ventilation therapy, 
versus a minor acute respiratory reaction that resolves 
in most cases with minor treatment. We assume that 
we shall not gather additional information; we shall 
base our action only on information already collected. 
A vertical line through the bounds in Figure 5( a) in­
dicates Protos' decision to halt inference after 20 sec­
onds. At this time, the EVC becomes nonpositive. 
Figure 5(b) displays the time-dependent utilities of 
four outcomes, constructed as the product of actions 
and states of the world: We treat (A!) or do not treat 
(A2) the patient with an invasive treatment, and the 
patient either has (H1) or does not have the severe 
respiratory problem (H2). The time-dependent p' is a 
function of the utilities, which were assessed from an 
expert. In this case, the utility of outcome A1H1 ,t­
the utility of acting to treat the patient for the severe 
respiratory problem-decays significantly with delay. 
Figure 6 displays a graph of the utility of actions A1 
and A2 at the time action was recommended, as a 
function of the probability of H1. The broken line, 
adjacent to the solid utility lines, indicates the util­
ity of A1 at to, allowing us to inspect the effect that 
delay has had on the value of the time-dependent out­
come. The graph displays the upper and lower bounds 
(ub, lb) at halting time, the mean value between these 
bounds, and the decision threshold p' at the time Pro­
tos recommended action A2. The graph also displays 
the final point probability of H1, computed after the 
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Figure 7: A less critical situation. (a) Here, decision 
dominance is proved as the upper bound moves below 
the decision threshold. (b) The time-dependent util­
ities for the four outcomes. (c) Graphical analysis of 
the bounds and utility at halting time. 
the entire inference problem is solved. The value of 
the point probability indicates that an instantaneous 
complete analysis would have recommended the same 
action. This is not always the case. 
To demonstrate the sensitivity of Protos' analysis to 
changes in time-dependent utilities, we consider the 
same decision problem with a smaller micromort flux 
for the utility of outcome, A1H1,t. Figure 7(a) displays 
the convergence of bounds on belief and the trajectory 
of the decision threshold for the revised problem. The 
reduced time-dependence of utilities of the outcome 
are displayed in Figure 7(b). With the revised utility 
model, which represents a less critical situation, Protos 
now reasons for 40 seconds before making a recommen­
dation not to treat for H1. The EVC/BC remains pos­
itive until the upper bound passes beneath p*, proving 
the dominance of A2. Figure 7(c) displays graphs of 
the utilities and bounds at the time action was taken. 
Let us now examine Protos' performance on a car­
diac decision problem with a focus on the use of de­
fault and customized utility models. Consider the case 
where Protos is challenged with recommending action 
for a patient who suddenly demonstrates extremely 
low blood pressure and tachycardia (an extremely fast 
heart rate). Assume the problem has been narrowed 
to two mutually exclusive syndromes: congestive heart 
failure (H!) and hypovolemia (H2). Hypovolemia is 
a dangerous state of decreased blood volume caused, 
for example, by dehydration or bleeding. Congestive 
heart failure (CHF) is a serious condition in which the 
pumping ability of the heart is weakened; like hypo­
volemia, it causes low blood pressure and poor oxy­
genation of tissues. Although hypovolemia and CHF 
share salient symptomatology, the treatments for these 
pathophysiological states conflict with each other. The 
treatment for hypovolemia (A2) is to give the patient 
fluids to restore them to a normal level. In contrast, 
the primary treatment for CHF (AI) is to reduce the 
quantity of liquids in the body with a diuretic. Er­
roneously treating a patient who has CHF with fluid­
replacement therapy, or treating a patient who has hy­
povolemia with diuretic therapy, is life-threatening. 
In Protos' default time-dependent utility model for the 
average case situation, the cost of delaying the treat­
ment of CHF is described by an exponential decay con­
stant that is ten times larger than the constant used 
to characterize the cost of delay in treating hypov­
olemia. Protos computes the probability of CHF by 
propagating observations in the Dxnet belief network. 
Figure S(a) shows a trace of the update of the probabil­
ity of CHF. Here, Protos is considering a new finding 
that a patient's pulmonary capillary wedge pressure is 
normal. (Protos was previously informed that the pa­
tient displayed low stroke volume and had low central 
venous pressure.) The vertical line indicates Protos' 
decision to halt in 115 seconds. At this point, the sys­
tem recommends that the patient should be treated for 
CHF. The dominance of this decision is proved when 
the lower bound crosses the decision threshold p*. 
For this decision problem the micromort flux assoc­
iated with delaying treatment for CIIF is represented 
as a function of the patient's blood pressure. Let us 
lower the blood pressure and reevaluate the case. In 
response to a significant drop in blood pressure, Pro­
tos increases the exponential decay of the value for 
the outcome of treating for CHF, when CHF is in­
deed present. In this case, the decay of u(A1H1 ,t) is 
increased from c·0011 to e- oost Figure S(b) shows 
the same probabilistic analysis with the use of the re­
vised time-dependent utility model. Protos now rec­
ommends that the patient should be treated for CHF 
after only 30 seconds of computation. In the more crit­
ical case, action is indicated before a decision threshold 
is reached because the EVC becomes nonpositive be­
fore a probability bound crosses the decision threshold. 
4.2 Discussion 
We have made several observations about Protos' be­
havior. We have found that, in many cases, a utility­
directed analysis of probabilistic inference dictates 
that actions should be taken after a small fraction of 
(•) (b) 
Figure 8: (a) Bounds convergence and decision thresh­
old for decision dilemma involving treatment for CHF 
(AI) versus for hypovolemia (A2). (b) Same decision 
problem with increased decay of the outcome of treat­
ing for CHF when CHF is present. 
an analysis has been performed. Thus, even approxi­
mation methods with relatively slow convergence can 
be more valuable than faster exact algorithms. Two 
salient examples of this phenomena are displayed in 
Figure 9. In such cases the ideal decision is determined 
in the first few seconds of an analysis. More generally, 
we have found that decisions about the ideal length of 
time to deliberate and the ideal action to take are sen­
sitive to the details of the time-dependent utilities of 
outcomes, the information about the convergence of an 
approximation strategy, and the trajectory of partial 
results generated by approximate inference. 
We have observed behaviors that highlight the com­
plexity of the interplay between time-dependent utility 
and time-consuming inferential processes. Some of the 
behaviors are explained by the limitations associated 
with the use of a myopic measure of EVC. We found 
that dependencies between time-dependent utility and 
inferential processes can make computation time and 
recommended actions sensitive to small changes in a 
time-dependent utility model. In some cases small 
changes in the time-dependencies in a utility model 
change the ideal recommended action a We found that 
increasing the time-dependent decay of the utility of 
an outcome can increase the duration of reflection. In 
these cases the trajectory of converging bounds sur­
rounds and "keeps step" with an increasing or decreas­
mg p*. We observed situations where an agent apply­
ing a myopic EVC estimate may be in the unlucky 
situation of continuing, for several steps, to observe 
a positive EVC, yet see its expected utility continue 
to diminish with delay. We identified cases where the 
EVC/BC returns to a positive value after it has been 
zero or negative. Such nonmonotonicity in the EVC 
motivated us to implement lookahcad analyses that 
. 
3Related problems with an optimal decision changing 
With delay for analysis have been identified previously 
m the context of decision analysis (McNutt and Pauker, 
1987). 
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Figure 9: (a) Bounds convergence and decision 
threshold in the Alarm network for treating possible 
left-ventricular failure. (b) Bounds convergence and 
decision threshold in reasoning within the Dxnet be­
lief network to support a decision about treating for a 
pulmonary embolism. 
consider two or more future steps of computation. We 
are experimenting with more advanced lookahead tech­
niques. More generally, we are pursuing the develop­
ment of methods to monitor and modify behavioral 
patterns that have roots in the myopic EVC evalua­
tion, and for identifying cases where the results of an 
analysis are sensitive to small fluctuations in the tra­
jectory of time-dependent utilities or probabilities. 
Before concluding, we stress that we have addressed 
the assignment of belief and utilities by limited agents; 
we have not discussed the automated construction of 
decision models. In the current version of Protos, pre­
constructed decision problems are passed to the sys­
tem, in reaction to salient observations. We foresee 
that ongoing work on procedures for constructing de­
cision models (Wellman, 1988; Breese, 1990; Hecker­
man and Horvitz, 1990) will foster the development of 
more comprehensive agents that can build as well as 
solve decision problems under bounded resources. 
5 SUMMARY 
We described the assessment and use of time­
dependent utility in limited computational agents that 
are charged with taking ideal action in time-critical 
contexts. Analyses with Protos have demonstrated 
that the duration of computational analysis and the 
ideal decisions to make in the world can be sensitive 
to the time-dependent utilities of relevant outcomes. 
We discussed the generalization of lottery-based as­
sessment techniques to mathematical models which 
represent the decay of utility of outcomes with delay. 
After describing the problem of customizing the time­
dependency of default utility models in response to ob­
servations, we presented examples of Protos' behavior 
on time-pressured medical decision problems. Finally, 
we discussed some of Protos' behaviors and described 
158 Horvitz and Rutledge 
ongoing work on the development of nonmyopic infer­
ence monitoring and control procedures. 
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